1. We begin by calling attention to the general objectives of the law of defamation as it exists in this State. It is often said that the law here seeks to achieve "the defence of reputation on the one hand and the defence of free speech and expression on the other" (Jones v. Skelton (1963) 1 W.L.R. 1362 (P.C.) per Lord Morris at 1373). Where the two objectives conflict, a New South Wales judge has said, the right of the citizen to have his good name maintained unimpaired must give way to the right of the citizen to speak his mind freely and honestly on matters of public interest (Jones v. Skelton (1961) 78 W.N. 873 (F.C.) per Ferguson, J. at 880). A member of the Court of Appeal of this State has likewise recently referred to the "great and growing need of free communication" (Clines v. Australian Consolidated Press Ltd. (1966) 84 W.N.(Pt. 2) 86 (C. of A.) per Jacobs, J.A. at 105). These general aims of the system are reflected in the pattern of the law, consisting - broadly - as it does of a general cause of action in respect of publications calculated to harm reputation, which may be defeated by a showing that the publication was true and for the public benefit, or that it was fair comment on some matter of public interest, or that it was the subject of privileged communication on some ground of public or private interest.

2. More detailed analysis shows a somewhat greater complexity in the objectives served, both as reflected in what the plaintiff is allowed to recover and in what may be matter of successful defence. We take these in order.

3. As the law now stands, imputations concerning a man or his family which are likely to injure him professionally are actionable as defamation, even if they do not attack his reputation in the ordinary sense. But more important practically than this limited extension of the protection of the action beyond the field of reputation, are the implications of the rules relating to damages. Once it is shown that the defendant has wrongfully published material likely to harm the plaintiff in reputation or profession, the plaintiff may recover compensation not only for that harm but also very often for the pain of mind he suffers from the affront, which recovery may sometimes represent a major part of the damages. In circumstances where the defendant has behaved with particular arrogance and disregard of the plaintiff's interests, exemplary damages may also be awarded to the plaintiff to mark the jury's disapproval of the defendant's behaviour. Briefly, therefore the law seeks not only to protect reputation but, in limited circumstances, to protect career interests, to solace affronted personal feelings, and to exercise a moral disciplinary control over wrongdoers. As conceived by Sir Samuel Griffith, one provision of the present law attempts further to protect injured family pride, but it is perhaps more than doubtful whether this attempt has been successful.

4. Turning to the objectives of the defences permitted by law, these are only imperfectly represented as freedom of speech. The only general protection for freedom of speech as such was the principle that equity would not restrain publications as a "censor morum" even they were of a kind that would lead to liability in damages after the event. But the significance of this principle has been diminished by the grant of statutory powers to the common law jurisdiction to restrain the repetition or continuance of defamation. The defences available against the award of damages make a patchwork. The law has no general objective that the truth should out, since truth in this State will Only serve as a justification for defamatory publication where a jury considers that it was for the public benefit that the particular communication should be made. There appear to be no general rules as to what a jury will be permitted to think on the subject of public benefit, and the objectives which comprise public benefit in this context may therefore vary within wide limits with the composition of the jury. Apart, however, from a showing of truth, defamatory matter may be capable of other defence, and these defences are most numerous where the matter is associated with the workings of government. Protection exists for defamation in the course of the public proceedings of the various branches of government themselves and for reports of those proceedings. Fair comment on any of the proceedings which may be so reported is also protected, in addition to fair comment on the conduct of public officers and public men generally. Qualified protection, of somewhat uncertain extent, is also provided for the disclosure of defamatory facts, as well as comment, about those associated with government or whose activities affect government. Beyond the point where the working of government is involved, qualified privilege exists aimed at the protection of private financial and domestic interests of various kinds from legal actions in respect of defamatory fact or comment. Fair defamatory comment, as distinct from defamatory assertions of fact, may be made upon books, public exhibitions and performances, and works of art. But it is only in this last mentioned aspect that the law seeks to defend freedom of speech on specifically cultural grounds as distinct from the defence of free speech in furtherance of political, financial and domestic interests.